Abstract
on the other as being dangerously erotic, 11 threatening carriers of a culture which is 'other.'
In debates about the nature of globalised rights movements, distinctions are sometimes drawn between economic globalisation with a neo-imperial ideology and the concept of globalisation as being a purely technical process descriptive of the increasing ease with which people can contact one another across the world. While it has frequently been argued that the former model of globalisation has been harmful to women, 12 it is also argued that the latter processes are of benefit in developing a solid Conversely Naila Kabeer is critical of a portrayal of women only as victims of economic globalisation and argues for more complex analysis of the impact of global processes which take into the specific contexts and agency of women. See Naila Kabeer, 'Globalisation, Labour Standards, And Women's By phrasing it this way Falk makes it clear that we cannot completely distinguish socalled good or bad globalisations by the supposed purposes of the law or of global movements. Even human rights law and movements may be used to further domination and exploitation. Accepting that there can be such problems with rights discourses is not to deny the value of rights rhetoric and norms per se, but rather to insist that we interrogate the use and nature of rights discourses wherever they take place. Ibid. we can identify two positions: 'feminist orientalism' where orientalists use women's rights to legitimise neo-colonialist policies without necessarily having any concern for feminist positions, and 'orientalist feminism', where genuinely feminist discourses are presented in such a way that they support orientalist discourses. 28 The distinction
Bahramitash draws is useful because it shows the need to approach this in two ways;
firstly that there is a need to expand the debate within feminism, secondly that irrespective of any need to broaden the debate feminists must urgently address the fact that 'outside of feminist circles, principles of gender equality [are] being deployed as part of a demonisation of minority cultural groups' 29 from which women are not exempt.
The invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11 provides an illustration of both feminist Where a claim is brought in relation to rights that are 'limited' in this way, the ECtHR must first evaluate if there has been some interference with the right. It must then consider whether the interference was carried out in accordance with 'law' and whether it was in pursuance of a 'legitimate aim', and, finally, the Court must ask whether the interference was 'necessary in a democratic society,' taking into account whether the level of interference was proportionate in relation to the aim pursued. In relation to the latter, there is a 'margin of appreciation' allowed to each state within which the courts can consider the specific conditions pertaining to the state in question. This means making allowances for local conditions between states in the way that rights are implemented. When applying the 'margin of appreciation', the Ibid. contribute to the development of a culture of respect for rights by the Turkish government.
62
The case of Leyla Sahin concerned a student who was excluded from her university for wearing a headscarf. Leyla Sahin, a practising Muslim, studied medicine in Turkey from 1993 until her expulsion from the University of Istanbul in 1998. She chose to manifest her religion by wearing a headscarf and had worn a headscarf to the University of Bursa for the four years she studied there. She was also initially allowed to wear it to the University of Istanbul when she transferred her studies there in 1997.
In February 1998, the university issued a circular notifying that there would be a clamp down on prohibited forms of dress, which included the wearing of 'Islamic headscarfs'. In March 1998, Sahin was first refused access to her year five exams because she was wearing a headscarf. Subsequently she was refused access to other classes and exams. Although her actions remained peaceable and her protests consisted of appealling to the authorities, she refused to remove her headscarf and was expelled. After exhausting her claims in the domestic courts, she applied to the European Court of Human Rights.
63 She argued that the ban and the expulsion had breached her Article 9 'right of freedom to manifest religion' and her Protocol 1 (2) right to 'freedom to education' she also claimed a breach of Article 8 right to private and family life, Article 10, right to freedom of expression and Article 14 the right to be free from discrimination, in relation to enjoyment of the Convention rights.
The case was first heard by a Chamber of 9 judges and then, on appeal by Sahin, to a Grand Chamber composed of 17 judges. The Grand Chamber affirmed the decision and reasoning of the Chamber in finding that there was interference with Article 9(2) but there was no breach of Article 9 and that Articles 8, Article 10, and Article 14 which were considered to have added nothing to the claim.
Unlike the Chamber, the Grand Chamber found it was appropriate to consider the interference with the right, which had been restricted by the prohibition in the circular. 64 In keeping with the finding on Article 9, they likewise considered that the aim of keeping educational institutions secular was a legitimate aim because it related to the protection of the rights and freedoms of others 65 and that it had been imposed proportionally.
66
The approach taken by both chambers was surprising. As noted by Judge Tulkens in her dissenting opinion, it seemed that the Court had abandoned its role of review altogether. 67 Certainly the logic used to support Turkey's position was flawed and clearly based on a number of presumptions rather than any evidence presented by the state. Arguably, it seems that neo-orientalist perspectives blinded both Chambers from requiring the state to prove the case for interference. The Grand Chamber accepted without demur the assertion by Turkey that the interference was 'reasonably necessary in a democratic society' in order to pursue the legitimate aims of maintaining secularism and promoting women's equality. 68 The problem, as pointed out by Judge Tulkens in her dissenting judgement, is that the claims of the state are not submitted to any rigorous human rights analysis. 69 While Turkey raised women's equality as a 'legitimate aim', Turkey neither had to justify headscarf bans as necessary to achieve this aim nor argue that they were a proportionate way of achieving it. Moreover, the Grand Chamber accepted that equality for women could only be achieved within the particular brand of secularism espoused by Turkey without stating why it considered this to be so. The claims were seen as self-evident.
The key to this thinking lies perhaps in the unequivocal position that the Grand Chamber adopted in relation to the 'headscarf. ' In a statement, cited with approval by The report was striking in that it presented a partial look at the problems associated with women and religion in Europe. It focussed only on the problems posed to women from within their religious communities rather than also looking at the discrimination experienced by women on the basis of their religion. In the report, the Special 80 Sahin, above n 6 Tulkens, para. 9. 81 
IV -The Human Rights Context And Consequences Of This Approach
In coming to their decision in the Sahin case, the Grand Chamber looked at the situation in other countries within the Council of Europe and also referred to Council of Europe materials on higher education. 93 The Judges noted that some other countries had headscarf bans within schools and public institutions but there seemed to be no consensus among member states on whether this was appropriate. This lack of consensus was used to justify the wide margin of appreciation allowed to Turkey by hostile stereotyping…'. 98 The committee said it was 'rejecting all deterministic views of Islam and recognising the great diversity intrinsic in the practice of this religion.'
Amongst other matters, the recommendation urged member states to 'take the necessary measures to eliminate any manifestation of discrimination on grounds of religious belief in access to education' 99 and advised member states to 'pay particular attention to the situation of Muslim women, who may suffer both from discrimination against women in general and from discrimination against Muslims…'. 100 However, even if the Grand Chamber in Sahin had examined this recommendation, the specific points in it were aimed at 'governments of member states, where Muslim communities are settled and live in minority situation in their countries,' 101 so, by default, the ECRI excluded Turkey where Muslims are a majority.
In Sahin, no other international rights instruments or recommendations from regional or international Committees were examined, though at the relevant time, similar issues were being addressed by other international committees and non-governmental organisations. It is suggested that if the Grand Chamber had examined the issue within a wider frame, it may have had cause to re-think the simplicity of its conclusion about an automatic connection between the promotion of equality and human rights and the headscarf ban.
Given the emphasis placed on imposing the ban as part of a strategy to achieve women's equality, the Court should have gone on to consider whether this ban had any other consequences for women as well as how it fitted in with Turkey's wider equality strategy. The United Nations expert committee on women's rights, the is free from religious identity. This position is supported by essentialist feminist perspectives which fail to recognise both the intersectional nature of identity and understand the way in which this mediates discrimination against women. The persistence of this 'orientalist' perspective from the European Convention treaty bodies simultaneously causes and obscures the very serious discrimination facing women from minority groups in Europe. It does both of these things by effectively sanctioning breaches of the right for Muslim women to manifest religion and contributing to a negative discourse which makes Muslim women targets for hate crimes.
It is indeed ironic that women are treated less favourably through a rhetoric of equality and 'women's rights' and it raises serious questions about the universality in the application of rights to Muslim women. There is a need to rethink frameworks which regard 'equality' as antithetical to 'culture' and incompatible with non-Western contexts. This is not to abandon a universal application of human rights: rather it is to 150 Mohanty, above n 25, 336. 151 Youmans, above n 28; Allain, above n 28; Falk, above n 17. 152 Marshall, above n 5.
